Grenfell – Never Again: How the Inquiry intends to avoid another tragedy

There are occasional tragic events which redefine how an industry operates. The Piper Alpha Disaster in 1988 was one. The Grenfell Tower Tragedy in 2017 will be another. The words of Inquiry Chair, Sir Martin Moore-Bick that "[t]he simple truth is the deaths were all avoidable, and those who lived in the tower were badly failed,” and the criticisms made of various bodies make for sombre reading.

The construction industry, particularly in relation to works carried out on high-rise residential buildings, has changed almost unrecognisably from 2015/2016 when the renovation works were carried out at Grenfell. However, there are a number of recommendations which have been made in the Inquiry's Phase 2 Report to try and ensure that "never again" becomes a reality. We have set out a number of the key recommendations for those involved in the construction of buildings below:

• What is a Higher Risk Building (HRB) – Many of you reading this will be familiar with the definition of an HRB set out in the Building Safety Act 2022 (BSA) "at least 18 metres in height (or has at least seven storeys) and contains at least two residential units". The Inquiry has recommended that this definition is urgently revisited, with a particular focus on building use and the likely presence of vulnerable people in the building.
• Better defined responsibilities – Another key point of the BSA was the introduction of the Building Safety Regulator to oversee HRBs. The Inquiry has recommended that the Government go further, and set up a single regulator responsible for all construction industry functions (including the regulation of products, building control functions and the accreditation of fire risk assessors). It also recommends that a single Secretary of State is appointed to cover all matters relating to fire safety.
• Approved document B (and other guidance) – The Inquiry was clear that it did not feel that Approved Document B provided the information needed to design buildings that are safe in the event of a fire. It has recommended that this position is reviewed and revised as a matter of urgency. It also recommends that a clear disclaimer is included in the document which sets out that compliance with the guidance will not necessarily result in compliance with Building Regulations.
• Contractors – The Inquiry has recommended a licensing scheme (operated by the recommended regulator) is introduced for principal contractors wishing to work on HRBs, and that it should be a legal requirement that any Gateway 2 application for building control approval includes a personal undertaking from a director or senior manager of the principal contractor that all reasonable care will be taken to ensure that on completion the building will be as safe as is required by the Building Regulations. The same recommendation has been made in relation to as senior manager of the principal designer.
• Fire engineers – A further recommendation is that the profession of "fire engineer" should be recognised and protected by law, and that an independent body should regulate the profession, defining the standards required for membership and monitoring their conduct.
• Fire safety strategies – Tying closely to the protection of the term "fire engineer", the Inquiry has recommended it be made a statutory requirement that a fire safety strategy produced by a registered fire engineer should be submitted at Gateway 2 and reviewed and resubmitted at Gateway 3.
• Building control – The Inquiry is very critical of the commercial nature of the Building Control function in England and Wales. To resolve this, it has proposed that the Government appoint an independent panel to review whether it is suitable for building control functions to be performed by people with a commercial interest in the process.

The UK Government has pledged to “carefully consider the report and its recommendations, to ensure that such a tragedy cannot occur again” and to prevent companies who have been criticised in the Report from taking on work on future public contracts. The Government are not obliged to implement the findings of the Inquiry (an update published in February 2024 noted that 33 of the 46 recommendations made in the Inquiry's phased 1 Report in 2019 had been put in place), but the sheer strength of feeling relating to the results of the Inquiry would suggest that something must be done.

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